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At the recent UNFCCC COP23 meetings, many diplomats and political leaders 
at all levels would start their proposals for policy goals and action on climate change by 
citing a disaster their country or region had experiences, or one that their neighbors or 
allies had suffered. While this evidence is anecdotal, disasters are a critical factor in 
how countries view the effect of climate change. However, the extent to which policy 
changes are driven by natural disasters is unclear. Using disaster data from the EM-
DAT and policy data from the Grantham Institute, we applied a hot spot analysis to 
identify spatial patterns of countries and their neighbors that are more impacted by 
major disasters than would be expected. We then compared these hot spots to countries 
with new climate policies to determine if there is a correlation between high disaster 
impact over a 5-year period and any subsequent policy. The resulting correlation 
between high disaster time periods and subsequent policy change was found to be 
present for 48 policies but the pattern overall in almost every case was not statistically 
significant or simply not present. We then focus on the 2013 flood of the Danube, Elbe, 
and Rhine rivers and analyze the policy changes of all nine countries (Austria, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia) directly 
impacted by this disaster. The impact of the flood on each country was calculated based 
on Lifeyears, a non-monetary measure of disaster damage (Noy, 2015). We found that 
Germany, Hungary, Austria, and Slovakia experienced greater damage than their 
neighbors, and as a direct result implemented the most relevant disaster policies. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Usually, when the terms effectiveness and disasters are used in the same 
sentence it is a discussion of disaster prevention, risk management, preparedness, or 
response. In contrast, here I assess what makes a disaster effective at driving policy 
change and, further, international climate policy. International climate policy is subject 
to many factors with diverse actors and complex interests; however, disasters have the 
potential to lessen these differences and garner international support for the cause of 
self-preservation or aid to neighboring countries and allied economies. To understand 
the impact of disasters on policy change we will examine national policy change for 
climate policy and a case study focusing on disaster policy. Each country has a different 
method of expediting topics from an agenda to law; therefore, events have different 
impacts in different governmental organizations, cultures, and locations. 
The scope of international climate policy is vast and policies span almost every 
industry and almost every country. The core of multinational agreements are to improve 
our global abilities to respond to, prevent further damage from, and adapt to the 
widespread effects of climate change. Due to the complexities of these issues, climate 
policies can take years, or even decades, to reach final agreements. Since 1992, with the 
adoption of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 
there have been 23 sessions of the Conference of Parties (COP) to discuss treaties and 
plans for goals on emissions targets, innovation in adaptation efforts for economic 
development and energy, land use change, and deforestation. One of the key themes of 
these international meeting are disasters, which tend to set the focus for the meeting. 
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For example, in 2017 the meetings had many discussions centered around 
implementation of the Paris agreement using disasters like Hurricane Maria as an 
example of future potential issues. 
These conversations for climate policies are complicated in that the very 
understanding of “nature”, and therefore climate and disasters, varies between people 
and places. There is a duality of nature and the meaning of the word itself. Nature can 
be seen as ‘external’ or ‘universal’ in this duality context (Smith, 1984). When 
considering climate change there is much debate over the concepts of nature, especially 
from this perspective: to what degree do we, as humans, have the capacity to influence 
such a force? Climate change policy is therefore equally relevant to this question of 
nature as being influenced by or influencing humans. For some skeptics of climate 
change, this question could be a major contributing factor to the denial of a need for 
mitigating policies. If nature cannot be influenced by humans then there would be no 
reason to even consider a political intervention for something that is deemed 
impossible. On the other end of the spectrum, to claim nature as only external and 
ruined by humans is just as far-fetched because, in reality, everything is in some way 
touched by humans. The idealist view of nature is threatened by human contributions to 
climate change. There is also external nature in that nature is often treated as something 
“which mankind attempts to dominate and oppress, ravage and romanticize…” (Smith, 
1984:26) This perspective could explain part of the resistance to the progress of climate 
policy and therefore reveal arguable need for disaster-driven catalysts. However, 
institutional resistance to any kind of policy change should not be forgotten as a 
contributor to the deadlock in any policy domain, not just those dealing with nature.  
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These diverse definitions of nature are reflected in the way different people and 
institutions approach the topic of disasters. In regards to policy mitigation, Cronon 
(1996) offers a useful description of the way we approach natural disasters:  
“Often when we label a problem as ‘natural’, we imply that there’s not much we 
can do about it. It’s just the way things are, and we’d better get used to 
it…Although it may be perfectly natural in an earthquake for wetlands to shake 
more violently than drier ground, there is nothing natural – common though it 
may be – about building highways or houses in such places.” (Cronon, 1996:30) 
Michael Watts (1983), in Silent Violence: Food, famine & peasantry in northern 
Nigeria, offers a differing definition, describing human crises in terms of a long-term 
‘natural’ disaster:  
“…much of what passes as natural hazards are not really natural at all; 
drought may be a catalyst or trigger mechanism in a sequence of events that 
lead to famine conditions, but the subsistence crisis itself is more a reflection of 
the structural ability of the socioeconomic system to cope with the unusual 
harshness of ecological conditions and their effects.” (Watts, 1983:17)  
These different perspectives on what is ‘nature’ add an extra dimension of complexity 
for climate policy, which already relies upon the convoluted and lengthy international 
policymaking process. 
Place is often a factor in several different policy domains but is particularly 
evident in environmental policy as they are so intertwined. The emotional investment in 
a place, which can drive the effort put into policy making, has a very significant impact 
on the subsequent protection or degradation of that place (Halpenny, 2010). Space and 
geographic relationships between countries are fundamental to aspects of traditional 
lawmaking and international negotiations, such as common goods beyond borders. 
Lefebvre (1991) puts this concisely and ties it back to the previous discussion of nature 
in his famous Production of Space:  
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“…natural space has not vanished purely and simply from the scene. It is still 
the background of the picture; as décor…Everyone wants to protect and save 
nature; nobody wants to stand in the way of an attempt to retrieve its 
authenticity. Yet at the same time everything conspires to harm it.” (Lefebvre, 
1991:30-31) 
For example, in the negotiations of the UNFCCC, this attitude is exemplified when all 
the countries had the distinct purpose in meeting to create a solution to anthropogenic 
climate change. Yet, throughout these discussions, the attitude of the diplomats’ actions 
show more concern with actual or perceived inequalities than solution-driven actions 
(Vogler, 2015). The pursuit of justice in diplomatic relations is tied back to place and 
the perceptions of a country’s power, space, and place. Disasters that affect multiple 
countries can potentially change those perceptions and relationships between 
neighboring countries, regardless of previous relationship, as the countries work 
towards a common goal of rebuilding. 
This research of interactions between disasters and policymakers negotiating 
international climate policy is important in terms of progress as described by Actor-
Network Theory (ANT). ANT offers a way of eliminating the nature-society duality by 
rejecting that binary paradigm and focusing instead on the relationships between things 
(Castree and MacMillan, 2001). The idea is to change the conversation from whether 
nature is affecting humans or humans are affecting nature and instead to look at all of it 
as a single system.  
While this study maintains the separation between humans and nature, by 
investigating the influence of nature (e.g. disasters) on humans, we draw upon ANT by 
looking at the combined workings on different countries instead of each as separate 
individual systems. By understanding the complex workings of international climate 
policy reform as a single system and not as separate countries, we can identify the 
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components that are more influenced by disasters. It has been shown that some 
variables do weigh more than others in terms of disasters and policy and agenda change 
(Birkland, 1996; Birkland, 1997). In particular, we focus on vulnerability differences 
for those directly impacted by disaster. This research of climate policy change drivers 
analyzes the interactions within the extensive network of actors in international 
policymaking, both directly involved and those removed from disasters, to work toward 
more solutions and better understand how we can anticipate future disasters and 
changes. 
Thomas Birkland, an expert on the effect of disasters on policy, has looked at 
this issue in-depth from an American federal policy standpoint. His first book, After 
Disaster, established that major sudden-onset events influence policy agendas but in 
different ways (Birkland, 1997). In his second book, Lessons from Disaster, published 
ten years later, he looks at these same events but their role in policy change (Birkland, 
2006). This research question is a follow-up of Birkland’s studies; we ask what makes 
the difference in these focusing events to determine if they will influence policy 
agendas or actual policy change, with a focus on climate policy. Climate policy is of 
interest because climate change itself cannot be seen as a “potential focusing event” by 
definition because it is not a sudden occurrence; its impacts have taken and will take 
decades if not centuries to be fully realized. On the other hand, climate policy is a 
controversial policy domain that has historically experienced repeated deadlocks, both 
from diplomatic interests and ideological differences. As focusing events are known to 
dissolve deadlocks, some proposed climate change policies may require the impact of 
disasters to break the barriers of diplomacy. 
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This study investigates the geographic relationship between disasters and 
climate policy, investigating the presence of spatial and temporal correlations between 
where major disasters occur and where and when policies related to mitigation or 
adaptation of disasters are adopted. Chapter 2 is a novel approach to how individual 
countries react to multiple disasters. A world-wide analysis reveals overarching patterns 
and identifies general relationships between disasters and climate policy 
implementation. This study asks if a time period of high impact from major climate-
related disasters for a single country correlates to climate policy implementations. We 
expect that these hot spots in disasters would correlate with national climate policy 
changes to mitigate future impact from disasters. In contrast to Chapter 2, Chapter 3 
examines the reaction of multiple countries to the same disaster. This localized case 
study and focused analysis of disaster policy in a narrower realm will show whether 
there is any relationship between disasters and policy for a circumstance outside the 
United States. Finally, in Chapter 4 we offer concluding remarks for the ultimate 
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 In the context of this study there have been large movements on international 
climate policy in the past three decades. The policy process for these changes includes 
many different actors and components to function and each of these pieces work with 
different levels of importance depending on the government structure. In general, for a 
policy to be passed there needs to be a problem identified, that problem needs to be 
salient enough to be under consideration within the political environment of the time, 
and solutions need to be provided as options to solve that problem (Kingdon, 1984). 
Policy windows are moments to take advantage of when those three aspects happen at 
the same time, which is usually a fleeting moment in which it is easier to pass policy on 
a specific topic (Kingdon, 1984). While this was the initial viewpoint of the studies to 
follow, the data available are not adequate to do a complete analysis based on this 
framework. The data available for policies and events without context for political 
attitudes of the time or other policy actors involved may be more applicable to a 
different framework, rather than the frameworks that have been used in studies with 
similar goals. This chapter will contain a brief overview of two other options for 
possible policy frameworks to be used for understanding the results of the subsequent 
studies and they will be evaluated in terms of interpreting the results more effectively 
later in Chapter 5. 
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History of Major International Climate Policy 
 
The UN has facilitated international climate policy as a whole. Most of these 
policy innovations have come through the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 
The IPCC is a group organized by the United Nations Environmental Programme 
(UNEP) and World Meteorological Organization (WMO) in 1988 to evaluate current 
research on climate change in three different wide-reaching categories: human impact, 
adaptation, and mitigation of climate change. The UNFCCC secretariat started as a 
means to facilitate negotiations on climate change between participating nations after 
the UNFCCC was adopted in 1992; over time it has also developed to include 
implementation of agreements. The secretariat organizes regular meetings for 
negotiations, including the largest of which, the annual Conference of Parties (COP).  
COP meetings have been the source of major international agreements on 
climate change as it provides a forum for all nations to participate in negotiations and 
sharing of knowledge. The most notable agreements have been the Kyoto Protocol and 
the Paris Agreement, which will be discussed in slightly greater detail in the following 
sections, but each year’s meetings have different goals and are generally successful in 
some aspect for progress, at the very least for diplomatic interactions and dissemination 
of climate change research. While most results of COP meetings are not legally binding 
they still act as an incentive for national change in policy to keep up with diplomatic 
efforts (Obergassel et al., 2015). 
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The Kyoto protocol was signed at the end of 1997 and included emissions goals 
that would be in effect for a five-year period from 2008-2012. The Kyoto Protocol was 
the first international agreement to put limits on greenhouse gasses (GHG). The 
structure had goals for GHG emissions but because they could not come to an 
agreement on one goal for all countries of the same development category. Each 
country had their own percent of decrease goal (Breidenich et al., 1998). 
“In the climate change regime, the Kyoto Protocol reflects a top-down approach. 
Although it gives states freedom in how they implement their commitments, it 
does not give them similar flexibility in defining the form, nature and content of 
their commitments.” (Bodansky, 2011:697) 
This freedom and flexibility also translated to disputes in who would be held more 
responsible for making larger changes in their national emissions profiles. The most 
developed countries, with the highest emissions, were given larger emissions reduction 
targets which was a source of contention in the proceedings. Ultimately, many of the 





The Paris agreement of 2015 effectively replaced the Kyoto Protocol with new 
and arguably more realistic goals.  
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“The Paris Agreement of 2015 is the first global accord on climate change that 
contains policy obligations for all countries. It is a hybrid that enshrines both 
bottom-up and top-down approaches to global climate governance. The new 
climate deal is a laissez-faire accord among nations that leaves the content of 
domestic policy to governments but creates international legal obligations to 
develop, implement, and regularly strengthen actions. National policies are 
subject to a robust international transparency system and global reviews, and 
successive policy plans must be progressively stronger.” (Dimitrov, 2016:1) 
Even with the new structure of goals and accountability there was still argument over 
whether the quintessential number goal would be to prevent a 1.5 degree rise or a 2 
degree rise in temperature. With continuing arguments over responsibility and 
development the divide was mainly between the industrialized North and the 
developing South. Even so, the change in accountability methods and efforts for 
measures to be legally binding make this agreement still have more teeth than the Kyoto 




 The policy process is a complex topic with many explanatory theories by 
political scientists attempting to pin down the parts and timelines. In reality, it is almost 
impossible to accurately predict every aspect of the policy process to know if a certain 
policy will make it past even the first stages of conception. The goal is to find a policy 
framework that will be most useful for understanding the changes in national policy 
around the world from disasters as focusing events. We look at national disaster policy 
as an indicator of climate policy because climate change is a long-term problem and 
policy decisions are mostly made in the context of short-term results. Disasters can be a 
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motivator for pushing longer term climate policies because the solutions for small scale 
disasters are often part of the larger solutions for climate change in general. 
 
Policy Framework Options 
 
Multiple Streams Model 
 
In using the general theory of Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Model, we would be 
able to use observed reactions of major disaster events to be prepared for policy 
windows as they come from major disaster events in the future.  
 The problem defining step is very important to establish an issue to then base 
solutions on. Problems, as they are defined, can then be used to make people aware of 
the problem so that they can appear on a policy platform, this is known as agenda 
setting. 
“Problem definition is related to, but different from, agenda setting. Problem 
definition is concerned with the organization of a set of facts, beliefs, and 
perceptions – how people think about circumstances. Agenda setting refers to 
the process by which some problems come to public attention at given times and 
places.” (Weiss, 1989:118) 
While they are different processes there are still many overlapping considerations and 
both are very important to the introduction of policy to the political stage. 
 Political attitudes play a big part in how policies can progress at any given time. 
Elected politicians are large actors in most governments around the world right now. By 
the nature of their elected positions it is in most politicians’ best interest to listen to, or 
at least acknowledge, their constituents’ concerns and attempt to solve them. With so 
many actors focused on self-interest, the stakes are often high for politicians to push 
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through their policy priorities over others, which in turn brings another consideration in 
the policy process. At the same time, non-constituent (or not necessarily constituent) 
interests also put more pressure on politicians as political organizations and lobbyists 
push priorities on behalf of corporations, communities, and demographic groups as a 
whole. 
Policy solutions undergo a process of, in the most basic sense, natural selection. 
Many interested parties might participate in policy introductions for solutions to any 
given problem. Factors that influence whether a policy survives this natural selection 
could be anything from budgeting, ease of implementation, whether there is anything 
inherently controversial attached, public opinion, and many other constantly changing 
considerations.  
 Policy windows can open when all of the previous three aspects of the process 
changes in a large way. When a new problem emerges visibly, when the attitudes of the 
public change, or when the government undergoes a change, like after an election. The 
policy window will only stay open as long as the issue or change is still happening; 
when the problem has been ‘solved’ or has just fallen off the public radar, no solution 
can be agreed upon, or if the problem does not seem to be solvable, the window will 
close. 
 Each of these changes is driven by policy actors and policy entrepreneurs 
(lobbyists, businesses, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, etc.). The role here 
in disaster policy is that these policy entrepreneurs may appear only for a short time and 
may have no previous involvement in policy because of the specialization of disaster 
policy (Birkland, 1997). Motivations, attitudes, and context are largely important in 
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understanding the process and actions behind this model and how the streams line up 
for change to occur. 
 
Policy Diffusion Model 
  
Walker’s Policy Diffusion Model looks at how policies passed in one place are 
used as models for other political units or neighboring states. Policy diffusion in this 
model is driven by internal and external factors. Internal factors are factors such as 
socioeconomic status, political parties, conflict, elections, policy entrepreneurs, and 
institutions (Theodoulou, 2013). External factor are factors including competition 
between political units and social learning (Theodoulou, 2013). Disasters, by their 
nature to spark re-evaluation of current policies, would be considered social learning 
but could influence some of the internal factors like socioeconomic status and policy 
entrepreneurs. 
Applications of the Policy Diffusion Model show that diffusion does happen but 
not necessarily how or why. The four prevailing mechanisms for international policy 
diffusion are coercion, learning, imitation, and competition; these are different from 
mechanisms that would be in play for smaller scales like city or state policy diffusion 
(Shipan and Volden, 2013). The goal of the Policy Diffusion Model is to differentiate 
between the mechanisms behind diffusion. For the purposes of this study that doesn’t 
account for motivations we would be unable to pinpoint causation but just look at the 
change in general.  
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Punctuated Equilibrium Model 
 
 The Punctuated Equilibrium Model is an attempt to explain why radical policy 
change happens when the normal behavior is by incremental change only. This model 
assumes long periods of stability interrupted by short periods of instability that then 
create a new equilibrium on which to base future change. In this model, change is 
driven by changes in ‘policy image’ and institutional policy values. Policy images are a 
compilation of both the information available and the overall attitudes of those involved 
(True et al., 2007).  
 Change, according to the Punctuated Equilibrium Model, comes based on the 
attitude toward problem definitions. When something brings the policy back into view 
the current state is then evaluated. If the problem definition stands, then the current 
policy is reinforced and only incremental change will occur. If the problem definition 
and current policy are questioned, that is when large and fundamental policy changes 
happen. The change comes from that interaction between the policy image and the 
political institutions responsible for them. 
 While this model is most often used in American studies, the use of bounded 
rationality as an explanation for decision making bodes well as actors working in self-
interest but constrained by institutional rules is not exclusively a characteristic of 
American government.  
“The ubiquity of serial attentiveness and organizational routines of operation 
lead us to expect that stability and punctuations are a feature of policymaking in 
many governments.” (True et al., 2007:173) 
One key requirement for applying this model to other national governments is that the 
political systems have to be open and democratic, uncontrolled by a central government 
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force. For an analysis of the whole world this is not always fulfilled. Differences in 
timelines and interactions between institutions and actors are to be expected but 
comparative value can still come from this model. The Punctuated Equilibrium Model 
works best in very specialized policy subsystems, which is exactly the case for climate 
and disaster policy. 
 
Advocacy Coalition Framework 
 
 The Advocacy Coalition Framework is a framework to show the complexity of 
policy change as an ongoing process, not with distinct stages. The Advocacy Coalition 
Framework assumes that each issue has its own ‘political subsystem’ consisting of 
competing advocacy coalitions, power brokers, and decision makers (Theodoulou, 
2013). The independent variables are those relatively stable parts of government such as 
the constitutional structure and dominant social or cultural values. Of course, these 
aren’t completely stable, they are just considered stable because they are harder to 
change (Theodoulou, 2013). Dependent variables are quickly changing things like 
elections, changes in the opinions of those with power or influence, and the state of the 
economy (Theodoulou, 2013). The framework’s conclusion is that change comes by 
changes in relationships within the subsystem via changes in the beliefs of the advocacy 
coalition. The main idea of the Advocacy Coalition Framework is that experts in the 
policy subsystem are who ultimately make decisions on policy change, though they are 
still influenced by outside factors of society and the economy. These policy actors 
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coordinate themselves into coalitions based on shared beliefs and policy preferences 
(Sabatier and Weible, 2007). 
 Another foundation of the Advocacy Coalition Framework is that there is 
‘policy-oriented learning’ and external shocks to the system, much like the previous 
Punctuated Equilibrium Model, but that these shocks can redistribute resources as well 
as attitudes among the policy subsystem (Sabatier and Weible, 2007). Causal links are 
still being studied in this context but the effects of external shocks have been seen to 
change the status of power among advocacy coalitions, where those with less influence 
can become more powerful with the extension of knowledge or change in circumstance 
following the shock. A recent update to the Advocacy Coalition Model includes an 
added consideration for internal shocks, differentiated from external shocks. While 
internal shocks do much the same as external shocks, to redistribute power and 
resources within a policy subsystem, one important difference is that internal shocks 
always allow the minority advocacy coalition to increase in power over the dominant 
coalition because the internal shock inevitably revealed a failure in the current policy 




Even from this brief overview of the steps and processes that new policies must 
undergo to be implemented it is amazing that any policy is passed at all. Adding in 
considerations of diplomacy for international policies, issues related to tragedy of the 
commons in environmental policy, and the controversy of responsibility for climate 
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change, international climate change policy is a feat to pass. According to models from 
the last IPCC report, current policies in place and those pending are still not as rigorous 
as is required to deal with the impacts of climate change around the world. Although 
these policies are groundbreaking, there is still much to be done. It is important to be 
able to understand this policy process and look at the relationships with climate-related 
disasters so that we can take advantage of the unfortunate situations as they come and 
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When international leaders describe their reasoning behind the need for climate 
change policy, their usual reference point is a recent disaster. Disasters are a factor in 
how countries view the effect of climate change, but the real question is how much does 
that perception make a difference in the policy process. Using disaster data from the 
EM-DAT and policy data from the Grantham Institute, a hot spot analysis was applied 
to identify spatial patterns of countries and their neighbors that are more impacted by 
major disasters than others. The Getis-Ord Gi* statistic shows hot spots that are then 
compared to implemented climate policy for the relevant temporal division to look at 
correlations between high disaster impact over a 5 year period and any subsequent 
policy. The resulting correlation was found to be present in 48 policies, but the pattern 




The topics involved in international climate policy are widely debated and by 
their nature influence many aspects of society from trade to transportation to national 
security to agriculture to manufacturing. Because these policies influence so many 
people, it is important to understand possible catalytic drivers of policy change or 
adoption. Natural and environmental disasters can cause millions of dollars of damage 
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and, all too often, loss of life. As these events unfold they often cause a new push for 
regulation, deregulation of industry, or a change in other influential policy to hopefully 
reduce further damage (Birkland, 1997). However, it is unclear why some natural or 
environmental disasters have greater influence on international policy change than 
others. This study looks at the geographic relationship between disasters and climate 
policy and investigates the presence of spatial and temporal correlations between where 
major disasters occur and where and when policies related to mitigation or adaptation of 
disasters are adopted. The main hypothesis for this study is a country experiencing a 
major disaster, that can be attributed to climate change, is subsequently more likely to 
introduce changes in climate change adaptation policy to reduce future exposure to such 
impacts than countries that did not experience the disaster. 
Heads of state speeches at the most recent UN meeting on climate change, most 
often began by mentioning some kind of disaster of their own country or of an ally 
before then recommending action or goals. Disasters are a factor in how countries view 
the effect of climate change, however, that perception does not always translate into 
actual policy change. Through the analysis of local statistics at the country level of 
disaster counts, we test whether a country that is more impacted by disasters over a five-
year period has more incentive to pass climate policy as a result. 
 
Policy and Disasters 
 
New legislation, regulations, and treaties are the most tangible examples of 
policy change, but are not the only indicators of changes. Political party platforms, 
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working policies of existing organizations, and executive orders are also evidences of 
policy change along with others. Environmental policy platforms for political parties 
have changed dramatically over the past few decades in many countries. This study will 
only consider actual legislation introduction and amendments while previous research 
has looked at simply agenda change and political party platforms change, which may be 
a less reliable indicator of change as party platforms can be largely superficial 
(Birkland, 1996; Birkland, 1997; Party Change Project, 2013; Manifesto Project, 2013). 
For disasters to drive policy change, the country has to subscribe to the paradigm 
understanding that risk can be reduced in the future via policy changes. Risk cannot be 
completely mitigated but risk and vulnerability can potentially be reduced beforehand if 
relevant action is taken (Baker, 2009). The role of government is widely believed to be 
responsible for considering the well-being of their citizens, therefore, they are 
responsible for identifying and reducing risk by mitigating disasters and reduce 
vulnerability by implementing response policies (Baker, 2009). 
Gaps in climate change policy have always been a problem with the 
effectiveness of climate change mitigation. Disasters, as focusing events, expose holes 
in policy that may then be pushed to be corrected, attempted to be corrected, or simply 
ignored until a more influential focusing event. The process of problem solving for the 
international policy gaps has not been widely studied. On the American federal level, 
the policy holes exposed by prominent hurricanes in the past two decades, were found 
mostly in emergency management and the insurance industry (USGAO, 2007). 
However, other storms have had similar size, power profiles, and impact ranges but did 
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not have the same effect on policy. The question is, what makes the difference between 
a potential focusing event and an impactful focusing event in the international sphere? 
Attribution studies have been more abundant in recent years to show the 
relationship between disasters and climate change. Even without attribution studies on 
every event, governments tend to relate disasters to changes in climate change policy 
whether it is scientifically founded or not (Pilli-Sihvola and Vaatainen-Chimpuku, 
2016; Rivera and Wamsler, 2014; USGAO, 2007). In a look at government documents, 
national and international, several disasters are identified in governmental reports as 
precursors to specific policy change. The United States Government Accountability 
Office list the financial burden of Hurricanes Katrina, Wilma, and Rita, as well as the 
potential of future earthquakes in the San Francisco and Los Angeles areas, as 
justification for change in the Federal Natural Catastrophe Insurance (USGAO, 2007). 
This report was also generated in 2007, and as part of the analysis, classified major 
cities in the United States on a scale of catastrophe risk. A notable example is that in 
this report New York City is on the very low end of the risk scale (only higher than 
Phoenix and Las Vegas) (USGAO, 2007). This report was done before Hurricane Sandy 
and obviously failed to anticipate risk in that case. The European Parliament identifies 
specific events of concern to the European continent in a report to European lawmakers 
about the impact of climate change. Recent disasters identified include the 1999 
windstorms in Scandinavia and France, the 2002 flood of the Danube and Elbe rivers, 
the severe drought of 2004-2005 in Southern Europe, and the heat wave of 2003 that 
caused large death tolls across the entire continent (Anderson, 2006). This particular 
document from the European Parliament also cites the 2005 hurricanes that affected the 
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United States and Caribbean countries as being of significant concern as well, showing 
the international effect of disasters even when they do not directly impact European 
nations (Anderson, 2006). The report suggested specific climate policy change for the 
EU Flood Action Programme and the EU solidarity fund, another example of far-
reaching impacts of disasters though this is predicated by the already established 
economic union of the European Union organization (Anderson, 2006). This is an 
indicator that disasters that impact neighbors and allies do have an influence on other 
countries’ political response to disaster, and will be considered in the hot spot analysis.  
In terms of political context of disasters, some studies have shown that disasters 
have the ability to provoke a significant policy response at the international, national, 
and subnational level (Pelling and Dill, 2010). The government is apt to take 
responsibility for action when pushed by the public but that only happens after the event 
and not proactively in any case (Birkland, 2004). In this case, the difference in the level 
of influence could be due to the authority or legitimacy of a country’s neighbors and 
their relationship. In international political theory, there are three reasons that one actor 
would do as another says: rational persuasion, pressure or fear of adverse consequences, 
or simply accepting the decision-making process as legitimate (Bodansky, 2007). The 
third is known as respect for legitimacy of an actor. Legitimacy does not necessarily 
mean legality; legality of an international institution has to do with its treaty basis which 
is usually state consent (Bodansky, 2007). Legitimacy is different because a lot of 
authority can be outside a legal system, such as parental authority or the pressure of 





Data related to recorded disasters worldwide and climate policy implemented 
were required for this analysis. The spatial analysis was completed using disaster data at 
a country level. Disaster data are from the EM-DAT: Emergency Events Database, run 
by the team at the Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) at the 
Université Catholique de Louvain (UCL) in Brussels, Belgium (EM-DAT, 2017). This 
database, as a whole, records any disaster around the world since 1900 that has killed at 
least 10 people, affected at least 100 people, caused a declaration of a state of 
emergency, or pushed for a call for international assistance. For the purposes of this 
study, only disasters from 1990-2016 were included. This time period was chosen to 
coincide with the policy data in the topic and include the most recent full year of data. 
Prior to 1990, there were very few practicing policies on climate change. From the list 
of disasters within the relevant time frame, these were additionally pared down to only 
include disasters that could be considered ‘climate-related’. These disasters are all in the 
EM-DAT’s “Natural” Disaster Group. This included the entire “Meteorological” 
subgroup, floods within the “Hydrological” subgroup, and drought1 and wildfire within 
the “Climatological” subgroup. The included disasters all belonged, effectively, to five 
main types of disaster: Extreme Temperature, Storm, Flood, Drought, and Wildfire. 
‘Extreme Temperature’ includes cold waves, heat waves, and any severe winter weather 
                                                
1 Drought is not commonly included in studies of focusing events because it is not 
generally a sudden onset occurrence. It is included here because it is a climate change 
related disaster and looking at a longer time period for the 5-year hot spot would 
include extended longevity disaster impacts. 
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conditions such as snow, ice, frost, or freezes. ‘Storm’ includes extra-tropical storms, 
tropical storms, and any convective storms such as derechos, hail, lightning, 
thunderstorms, rain, tornados, sand storms, dust storms, blizzards, storm surge, wind, 
and general severe weather. ‘Flood’ includes coastal, riverine, ice jam, and flash floods. 
‘Wildfire’ includes forest fires and any type of land fire such as brush, bush, or pasture 
fires. For these disaster data there was one inconsistency in that for one entry at the 
beginning of the data there is a major disaster included that comes from the Soviet 
Union. In the analysis, this entry was not included because there was no corresponding 
Soviet Union on the map for any of the collective time periods. The EM-DAT data does 
not include geographic data any more detailed than the country level so there was no 
way to narrow down which modern country it would have fallen into. In context with 
the policy data there were very few entries to correlate this instance to, so it was not 
considered a high priority loss of data.  
The policy data comes from the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change 
and the Environment and Sabin Center for Climate Change Law at the London School 
of Economics which maintains the database known as Climate Change Laws of the 
World (Grantham, 2017). This database includes all litigation and legislation on climate 
change around the world. For the purposes of this analysis only the legislation data that 
was tagged with the category of adaptation policy from 1990-2017 was included. For 
this analysis, these were also separated into executive policies and legislative policies, 




Methods and Analysis 
 
Data analysis was completed in three different sections. First separating and 
preparing the data for spatial analysis, spatial analysis using local statistical analysis 
technique, and finally comparing to find correlations between hot spots of high disaster 
impact and subsequent policy implementation. For each main type of disaster, EM-DAT 
provides a statistic for number of deaths, number of injuries, number affected, number 
made homeless, total human impact, and economic damage. To include in the analysis 
only the most influential disasters these were separated leaving six data categories for 
each of the five types of disaster. Only those in the top 10% of each category were 
considered the most influential and therefore were included in the spatial analysis. For 
example, from the EM-DAT collection of all disasters worldwide first separated only 
climate-related disasters, as previously described, from 1990-2016, resulting in 4,127 
disasters. Of these, 1,183 records were categorized as storm disasters. To determine if a 
disaster is major or not one might be tempted to look only at casualty counts, for the 
storm category this could range from a 1991 Bangladeshi flood that reported 138,987 
deaths, all the way down to the 292 floods that have zero reported deaths but were 
recorded by EM-DAT for meeting the requirements with a different indicator.  
Judging disasters by their casualties alone gives more weight to those disasters 
that occur in countries with higher population densities, more geographic vulnerability, 
or those that are less developed. If one were to instead choose another statistic like total 
damage, which is recorded economically you would then see a 2005 American storm 
(presumably Katrina) heading the list at $158,230,000,000, a number that would be 
30 
much easier to attain in a more developed country where even small amounts of damage 
can result in very high monetary costs (not that Katrina was insignificant by any 
means). The statistic chosen will inevitably favor some countries over others, the only 
way to avoid this bias was to take the top 10% of each statistic and again for each 
category to not favor one type of vulnerability over another either. The count used for 
the spatial analysis was a ‘weighted’ count, some of the disaster entries appeared in 
multiple top 10% counts, each category and statistic was considered separately in the 
weighted count to show those disasters that had a greater impact on the people of that 
country rather than just the raw number that could neglect those disasters that had major 
impacts in multiple ways. For example, the previous example, assumed to be Hurricane 
Katrina, was in the top 10% for number of fatalities and the top 10% for economic 
damage but was not in the 10% for any other statistic so it was counted as two major 
2005 American disasters to show its impact economically and for the people involved 
whereas in a raw count this would just be one. The final count of major disasters 
resulted in 591 disasters worldwide, the geographic distribution of which is shown in 
Figure 1. 
The question requires the distribution of disasters spatially and temporally so the 
data were then separated further into each 5-year time period and analyzed separately to 
look for changes over time that corresponded with subsequent policy changes. This 








Figure 1. Weighted Count of Disasters 
A count of disasters considered significant by appearing in the top 10% in at least one 
category of measurement for disaster indicators. 
 
 To look for spatial patterns an analysis of local spatial autocorrelation was 
required to find ‘hot spots’ or places that are more or less impacted by disasters than 
would be expected. The spatial analysis was done on each of the 5-year period datasets 
in ArcMap to calculate the Getis-Ord Gi* statistic and show hot or cold spots for 
disaster impact. This calculation used the countries’ disaster impact weight, as well as 
its neighbors’ disaster impact weight, with priority by inverse distance of neighbors. We 
use the influence of neighbors based on the political theory that neighbors have an 
influence on each other even if it is non-binding (Bodansky, 2007). The Getis-Ord Gi* 
statistic calculated the expected value under a null model of complete spatial 
randomness and the variance from that expected value, resulting in a Gi* statistic that 
includes a z-score in the calculation against the null hypothesis. This formula is shown 
as Equation 1 (O’Sullivan and Unwin, 2003; ESRI, 2017). For each dataset only those 
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G scores that were less than -1.96 standard deviations and greater than 1.96 standard 
deviations were considered as cold or hot spots, respectively (Bivand and Gomez-
Rubio, 2013). 
Equation 1. Getis-Ord Local Statistic 
Where xj is the attribute value for feature j, wi,j is the spatial weight between feature i 

















After the analysis was done to find hot spots in each 5-year time period globally, 
the results showed that China and India were the exclusive hot spots for every dataset 
except for the occasional inclusion of the United States. This is most likely a result of 
the large gap in the count of disasters for those three countries as opposed to the rest of 
the world. To combat this bias, the data were then split into four regions to look for 
regional hot spots, the presence of China and India were maintained, but this allowed 
some other countries in the Asia/Middle East/Pacific Islands region to also show up in 
some datasets, and other countries in the Americas, Europe, and African regions to also 
have a presence. The division of countries is shown in Figure 28. 
Each resulting hot spot was then compared to the policy database results to find 
any matching policies. Policies were classified as either legislative or executive policies 
based on how they were enacted. Legislative policies are those that are enacted through 
an official legislative body for that country. Executive policies are those enacted by a 
government executive, such as a President or Prime Minister, without necessarily going 
through policymaking negotiations, depending on the executive branch structure. 
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Policies were also given a tag for whether it acts as a ‘framework’ policy or not. 
Framework policies are those that serve as a basis for future policy, usually establishing 
goals or policies for more detailed policy to come. The assumption is that, in general, 
executive policies can pass faster than the extensive process of a legislative policy, so 
they were held to different time frames to determine correlation. An executive policy 
had to fall within two years of the end of a hot spot time frame and a legislative policy 
had to fall within five years of the end of a hot spot time frame to account for the policy 
lag from different types of governing. The resulting policies were considered correlated 
to high disaster impact before the implementation of the law. As a disclaimer on this 
measure in the study, a pure count of policies is not always indicative of success in 
legislating as a count tells nothing about the actual effectiveness of a policy but for the 
scope of this study a count is the best complete data available. 
To accurately confirm statistical significance of the correlations between high 
disaster impact time frames and subsequent climate adaptation policies two null 
hypothesis scenarios were also tested. High disaster impact time frames were compared 
to each null hypothesis, the first being climate transportation policies derived from the 
Grantham Institute database, and the second being randomly generated fictional policies 
with the same general characteristics as the climate adaptation policy dataset. The null 
hypothesis dataset was meant to be a comparable dataset of policies. While this could 
have originally been done with randomly generated data, the concern was that it would 
not be as thorough a test because climate policies have very distinct characteristics as 
they have grown in overall number and prominence since the 1980s. The first attempt 
was made to perform a null hypothesis test with real policies that were still climate-
34 
related but pertaining to a different subject matter. All of the Grantham Institute records 
for 1990-2017 were analyzed to find the best fit, the goal being to find a policy category 
that was the most unrelated to adaptation policy, with the fewest number of overlapping 
policies (any entry recorded in the Grantham database can have multiple subject matter 
tags), but also with a similar number of records to compare. The adaptation policy 
dataset had 347 policies, most from 2003-2017. Comparison to different policy types is 
shown in Table 1.  
Table 1. Potential Null Hypothesis Policy Options 
Policy areas compared for matching patterns to Adaptation and Mitigation policies but 
also with the least overlap. 




Number of Overlapping Policies 
with Adaptation and Mitigation 
Adaptation and 
Mitigation 
2003-2017 347 - 
Administrative 1993-2017 726 235 
Carbon Pricing 2003-2017 111 32 
Energy Demand 1993-2017 582 163 
Energy Supply 1990-2017 737 163 
Research and 
Development 
1998-2017 330 147 
REDD+ LULUC2 2000-2017 280 145 
Transportation 2000-2017 278 90 
 
From these options, transportation policy was chosen as the best fit because it 
had the closest overall match of characteristics with the lowest overlap. At the same 
time, there were still 90 of 278 policies overlapping. Having 33% of the same policies is 
                                                
2 Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries 
and land use land use change (REDD+ LULUC) 
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not necessarily an independent sample, so because of the situation a randomly generated 
null hypothesis was also created to compare both situations. The random null 
hypothesis was created using random number generation to create 347 records with 
random years attributed to each between 1990-2017, a random country indicator for one 
of 177 countries, and relevant characteristics such as whether it would be classified as a 
legislative or executive policy or if it was a framework policy or not. According to the 
average characteristics in the adaptation policy dataset 1/4 of policies were legislative 
while the remaining 3/4 were executive (also evidence to the policy lag assumption that 




Following the spatial analysis for each data set there were resulting significantly 
impacted countries for each temporal measurement. There never were any less than       
-1.96, indicating there were no “cold spots” in the data so there are no countries that are 
significantly less impacted by disasters than any others. There were between 10-18 “hot 
spots” in each data set. This resulted in 47 countries identified as being significantly 
more impacted by disasters in at least one of the time periods. Results for each 5-year 
time period are shown in Figures 2 through 24. The significant results from each time 
frame were then individually compared to that country’s climate policy to look for 
correlations. 
Of the countries found to be significant 10 of them had no applicable climate 
policy at all, 11 of them had relevant climate policies but none of those correlated with 
36 
high disaster time periods. The remaining 26 countries did have correlations between 
specific policies and times of high disaster impact. Of the 26 that did correlate, 15 of 
these were executive policy correlations, 2 were legislative policy correlations, and 9 





Figure 2. Disaster Hot Spots 1990-1994 Figure 3. Disaster Hot Spots 1991-1995 
 
 
Figure 4. Disaster Hot Spots 1992-1996 Figure 5. Disaster Hot Spots 1993-1997 
 
 
Figure 6. Disaster Hot Spots 1994-1998 Figure 7. Disaster Hot Spots 1995-1999 
 
 





Figure 10. Disaster Hot Spots 1998-2002 Figure 11. Disaster Hot Spots 1999-2003 
 
 
Figure 12. Disaster Hot Spots 2000-2004 Figure 13. Disaster Hot Spots 2001-2005 
 
 
Figure 14. Disaster Hot Spots 2002-2006 Figure 15. Disaster Hot Spots 2003-2007 
 
 





Figure 18. Disaster Hot Spots 2006-2010 Figure 19. Disaster Hot Spots 2007-2011 
 
 
Figure 20. Disaster Hot Spots 2008-2012 Figure 21. Disaster Hot Spots 2009-2013 
 
 
Figure 22. Disaster Hot Spots 2010-2014 Figure 23. Disaster Hot Spots 2011-2015 
 
 





Table 2. Adaptation Policy Matches to High Disaster Time Periods 
Policies that matched to correlate with one or more 5-year time period of high disaster 
impact for their country. The end of the period of high disaster impact must have been 












Bangladesh "Bangladesh	Climate	Change	Strategy	and	Action	Plan	(BCCSAP)" 2009 Executive Mitigation	and	Adaptation
Bangladesh "6th	Five	Year	Plan	(FY	2011-FY	2015)" 2011 Executive No
Bangladesh "The	Climate	Change	Trust	Fund	Act" 2009 Legislative No
Bangladesh "Disaster	Management	Act" 2012 Legislative No
Benin "Low	Carbon	and	Climate	Change	Resilient	Development	Strategy	2016	2025" 2016 Executive Mitigation	and	Adaptation
Brazil "Law	12805,	establishing	the	National	Policy	on	Farming-Livestock-Forest	Integration" 2013 Legislative No
China "The	National	Strategy	for	Climate	Change	Adaptation" 2013 Executive Adaptation
China "National	Plan	For	Tackling	Climate	Change	2014-2020" 2014 Executive Mitigation
China "12th	Five-Year	Plan	for	the	Development	of	National	Economy	and	Society	(2011-2015)" 2011 Legislative No
Colombia "National	Plan	for	Climate	Change	Adaptation" 2012 Executive Adaptation
Colombia "Law	1450,	establishing	the	National	Development	Plan	2010	2014 2011 Legislative No
Colombia
"Law	1523,	adopting	the	National	Policy	of	Risk	Management	and	the	National	System	of	Risk	
Management" 2012 Legislative No
Czech	Republic "National	Programme	to	Abate	the	Climate	Change	Impacts,	Government	Resolution	No.	187" 2004 Executive Mitigation
France "Climate	Plan	2004" 2004 Executive No
France "National	Climate	Change	Adaptation	Plan" 2011 Executive Adaptation
France "Climate	Plan	(Policy	framework)" 2013 Executive No
France "Farming,	forest	and	alimentation	Framework	Policy	No.	2014-1170" 2014 Legislative No
Germany "German	Strategy	for	Adaptation	to	Climate	Change	(DAS)" 2008 Executive Adaptation
Kenya "National	Environment	Policy	2013" 2013 Executive No
Kenya "Climate	Change	Act,	2016" 2016 Legislative Mitigation	and	Adaptation
Madagascar "National	Climate	Change	Policy" 2010 Executive Mitigation	and	Adaptation
Malawi "National	Climate	Change	Management	Policy" 2016 Executive Mitigation	and	Adaptation
Mexico "General	Law	on	Climate	Change" 2012 Legislative Mitigation	and	Adaptation
Mozambique "National	Environmental	Policy" 1995 Executive No
Niger "National	Policy	on	Climate	Change	(PNCC)" 2012 Executive Mitigation	and	Adaptation
Nigeria "Nigeria	Vision	2020" 2010 Executive No
Nigeria "National	Policy	on	Climate	Change" 2013 Executive Mitigation	and	Adaptation
Pakistan "Pakistan	2025:	One	Nation,	One	Vision" 2014 Executive No
Pakistan "Pakistan	Climate	Change	Act	2016" 2017 Legislative Mitigation	and	Adaptation
Peru "National	Strategy	on	Climate	Change,	Executive	Decree	No.	086-2003-PCM" 2003 Executive Mitigation	and	Adaptation
Philippines "Framework	Strategy	on	Climate	Change" 2010 Executive No
Philippines "National	Climate	Change	Action	Plan" 2011 Executive No
Philippines "Philippine	Disaster	Reduction	and	Management	Act	(RA	10121)" 2010 Legislative No
Philippines "The	People?s	Survival	Fund	Act	(RA	10171)" 2012 Legislative No
Portugal
"Council	of	Ministers	Resolutions	104/2006	and	1/2008,	establishes	and	amends	the	National	Climate	
Change	Programme	(PNAC)" 2006 Executive Mitigation
Spain "National	Climate	Change	Adaptation	Plan" 2006 Executive Adaptation
Spain "Spanish	Strategy	for	Climate	Change	and	Clean	Energy		and	the	related	Plan	of	Urgent	Measures" 2007 Executive Mitigation
Uganda "National	Policy	for	Disaster	Preparedness	and	Management" 2010 Executive No
Uganda "National	Climate	Change	Policy" 2013 Executive Mitigation	and	Adaptation
United	Kingdom "National	Adaptation	Programme" 2013 Executive Adaptation
United	States	of	
America "Executive	Order	13653:	Preparing	the	United	States	for	the	Impacts	of	Climate	Change" 2013 Executive Adaptation
Vietnam
"The	National	Climate	Change	Strategy	and	the	No:	2139/QD-TTg	Decision	on	Approval	of	the	National	
Climate	Change	Strategy" 2011 Executive Mitigation
Vietnam
"Decision	No.	543/QD-BNN-KHCN:	Action	Plan	on	Climate	Change	Response	of	Agriculture	and	Rural	
Development	Sector	in	the	Period	2011-2015	and	vision	to	2050" 2011 Executive No
Vietnam "Decision	1393/QD-TTg:	Vietnam	Green	Growth	Strategy" 2012 Executive No
Vietnam "Law	on	Natural	Disaster	Prevention	and	Control	No:	33/2013/QH13" 2013 Legislative Adaptation
Vietnam "Law	on	Environmental	Protection	No:	55/2014/QH13" 2015 Legislative No
Zambia "National	Climate	Change	Response	Strategy" 2010 Executive No
Zambia "The	Water	Resources	Management	Act,	2011" 2011 Legislative No
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Figure 25. Correlation Rate by Hot Spot Region 
Regional average correlation rate for disaster hot spots to adaptation policy. 
 
 
Figure 26. Adaptation Policy Correlations to Disaster Hot Spots By Year 
Correlation rates by hot spot in grey show the percent of times a given hot spot is 
matched to any policy. Correlation rates by policy in blue show the percent of policies 
matched to a disaster hot spot compared to the number of policies available to match.  
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Figure 27. Transportation Policy Correlations to Disaster Hot Spots By Year 
(Null) 
Null hypothesis built based on Grantham Institute entries tagged as transportation 
policy. Correlation rates by hot spot in blue show the percent of times a given hot spot 
is matched to any policy. Correlation rates by policy in grey show the percent of 






Figure 28. Random Policy Correlations to Disaster Hot Spots By Year (Null) 
Null hypothesis built based on randomly generated entries with randomly generated 
policy characteristics matching the general patters of adaptation and mitigation policy 
from the Grantham Institute. Correlation rates by hot spot in blue show the percent of 
times a given hot spot is matched to any policy. Correlation rates by policy in grey 
show the percent of policies matched to a disaster hot spot compared to the number of 






The results of the correlation study show of the 47 countries, 10 of them have no 
climate policy at all. Consequently, it is possible to do further analysis of policy 
changes on only 37 of the 47 countries involved. The 10 countries without climate 
policies may be a function of not having any perceived need or of the political and 
economic circumstances of those individual countries. Of the 37 that do have relevant 
policies, an average of about half correlate with a time of significantly high disaster 
impact. This is not a very conclusive measure and there are likely other drivers of policy 
change beyond disasters accounted for in this model. When looking at the data for 
regional effects, shown in Figure 25, this model is most obviously more successful in 
the Asia/Middle East/Pacific Islands region but this could also be explained by the 
constant presence of China and India’s hot spots in every 5-year time period, therefore 
any year they have a policy implemented is guaranteed to be a correlation match. The 
concern regarding the validity of the transportation null hypothesis was proved valid as 
shown in the result in Figures 26 through 28. The same general pattern for correlation 
occurs between adaptation policy and transportation policy over time that does not 
appear in the random policy scenario, this cannot surely be evidence of a significant 
pattern between just adaptation and transportation policy because it could possibly be a 
result of the overlapping policies alone. 
Compared to the transportation policy null hypothesis, there is 90% confidence 
level that disaster policy matches by 5-year time period are at a higher proportion than 
transportation policy matches, but that is the only statistically significant indicator. With 
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only one confirmed statistically significant aspect of the hypothesis and several that are 
statistically significant toward both null hypotheses it shows that disasters alone do not 
sufficiently contribute to climate policy changes. While the results of the study did not 
fit the conceptual model hypothesis there are many variables that influence climate 
policy and future studies have room for future studies on the socioeconomic factors, 
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Disasters are the most tangible representation of climate change in our time. For 
policy makers, the easiest way to engage their constituents in new policy is to relate it to 
a need. Natural disasters are an easily visible reference to remind people of a very 
pressing need for new disaster policy. The question comes from whether these common 
references are actually the instigator of policy change, and if so, do those changes 
coincide with the impact of the referenced disaster by degree. To compare policy 
responses to disaster it requires the disaster as a constant to see difference to the same 
disaster. For this reason, the 2013 flood of the Danube, Elbe, and Rhine rivers is the 
case study topic with a policy analysis across all nine countries (Austria, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia) that were 
affected by this one event. To compare equally the disaster impacts across multiple 
economic situations the use of a non-monetary measure of disaster damage, Lifeyears, 
was implemented (Noy, 2015). The expectation is that the country most impacted would 
have the most incentive and therefore implement disaster policy in response. This was 






Studies of policy change in the United States show disasters as focusing events 
in terms of new policy adoption (Birkland, 2004; Birkland, 2006). The question is 
whether this is the same outside the United States and whether there is a threshold for 
how severe a disaster has to be before disaster policy is altered to incorporate lessons 
learned from an experience. The hypothesis is that a country that is more severely 
impacted by a disaster would have more incentive and therefore pass changes to disaster 
policy following a major event. 
For this case study, a single disaster was required that was considered to be 
major climatologically, affecting multiple countries, and also not too recent to allow 
time for policy changes, but not too long ago as to no longer be relevant. From these 
criteria, the Danube/Rhine/Elbe Rivers flood of 2013 was the best fit with the most data 
available. This disaster is considered the 7th most severe flood in measurements of 
economic damage, with $12,900,000,000 (USD 2000) worth of reported damage, and 
largely impacted nine countries over the period of one month (EM-DAT, 2017). This 
case also gives the interesting aspect of having eight of the nine involved countries 
being a part of the larger European Union community, with one completing the joining 
process in the month of the flood (CIA, 2017). 
A comparison technique to include impacts from disaster across income levels 
was used to most accurately show damages for each country equally. This measure of 
Lifeyears, invented by Ilan Noy, is based on the World Health Organization’s Disability 
Adjusted Life Years to measure all damage in terms of human life instead of casualties 
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or economic damage, which can both depend on individual qualities of the country 
(Noy, 2015). 
National disaster policy has a long history of case studies observing action 
following a single disaster. The government is apt to take responsibility for action when 
pushed by the public but that only happens after the event, not proactively in any case 
(Birkland, 2004). Failure of the Tous dam in Spain in 1982 prompted a change from a 
focus on post-disaster aid and small scale flood controls to mitigation techniques and 
improved preparedness (Serra-Llobet et al., 2013). Italian landslides have the same 
indicators that the disasters open policy windows but they do not necessarily cause 
policy change as an event alone (Scolobig et al., 2014). These examples are of 
individual nation’s response to an individual event with limited comparative value to 
other situations. 
 




While inland flooding is one of the most common natural disasters the 
meteorological conditions of the 2013 European flood were rare but very similar to the 
situation of the major 2002 and 2005 floods of the same region (Grams et al., 2014; 
Breinl, 2015). The flood occurred from May 28 to June 18th with the effects of 
lingering floodwaters lasting much longer, in some cases years (EM-DAT, 2017; Liska, 
2014). The weeks prior to the flood were already cool and wet, saturating the ground. 
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Cool air was trapped over the Alps and warmer air was stalled north causing three 
consecutive cyclones moving westward (which is very unusual) and created a northerly 
flow against the west-east mountains, which created orographic enhancement of an 
already heavy precipitation event. This ‘warm conveyor belt’ process in that direction is 
a very rare situation but has “high potential for triggering very severe heavy 
precipitation events” (Grams et al., 2014).  
Major floods have become more frequent in the Danube River Basin over time 
(Bloschl et al., 2013). Major flood event records go all the way back to the 1700s but 
the more recent events were in 1954, 2002, and 2005 (Bloschl et al., 2013). Many of the 
areas affected by the 2013 flood are the same that were hit by the 2002 flood which is 
known to have already instigated policy changes. In some areas flood protection 
methods had been implemented following the flood of 2002. These avoided some of the 
damages in 2013 that would have occurred without those preventative measures. Most 
of those measures were in terms of physical levees rather than citizen education and 
preparedness (JBA, 2014; Bloschl et al., 2013). Damage evaluations of the entire flood 
showed the effects of the 2013 flood in Austria, Czech Republic, and Germany, at the 
same magnitude level of previous major floods in 1954 and 2002, even after the 
implemented programs over time (Fewtrell et al., 2013). For comparison to previous 
floods, Passau, Germany, experienced flood levels similar to the highest recorded flood 
ever from 1501 (Bloschl et al., 2013). The flood magnitude was measured in different 






Austria joined the EU in 1995 and has a fairly strong economy tied very closely 
to Germany. The geography of Austria is mostly mountains with the Danube flowing 
through. The majority of the population lives in the Northeastern region of the country, 
because of poor soils and steep slopes most elsewhere (CIA, 2017). The Danube basin 
covers 96% of Austria, save a very small portion of the western mountains; Austria 
covers 10% of the entire Danube basin (Gascoigne, 2009). Austria does receive high 
rainfall amounts in the Alpine mountainous regions, but much lower precipitation rates 
are recorded in the Northeast (ICPDR, 2006a). The Danube is used for hydroelectric 
power, amounting to 33% of Austria’s total electricity, and is widely used for 
transportation of goods and for drinking water. The river also has regularly flooded; 
with virtually all of the available valley being used for urban infrastructure or 
agriculture, there is very little water storage capacity surrounding the river (ICPDR, 
2006a). Austria’s political structure is a federal parliamentary republic with a civil law 
system. Austria’s government consists of an executive branch with a President and 
Chancellors, appointed by the President but determined by the Federal Assembly. The 
legislative branch is a bicameral Federal Assembly consisting of the Bundesrat, 
appointed by each of the nine state parliaments, and Nationalrat, directly elected by 




 Bulgaria joined the EU in 2007 and as a former communist country still has one 
of the lowest per-capita incomes of EU members (CIA, 2017; World Bank, 2017). The 
Danube River Basin covers almost half of the country and has 46% of the Bulgarian 
population residing within the basin (Gascoigne, 2009; ICPDR, 2017). Bulgaria’s 
government consists of a parliamentary republic and a civil law system. Bulgaria’s 
federal government consists of a President, elected by absolute majority in a popular 
vote, and a Prime Minister, elected by the National Assembly. Bulgaria’s legislative 
branch is a unicameral National Assembly, directly elected by proportional vote (CIA, 
2017). The Bulgarian corruption perception score is 43, the second lowest in the study 
region (CPI, 2017). This indicated that the government is not known to be connected 
with the citizens’ interests so policies may not be expected to follow logically after a 
disaster as those with less corruption would. 
Croatia 
Croatia joined the EU in 2013, and while it is the one of the wealthiest of the 
former Yugoslav Republics, for the countries affected by the 2013 flood it is ranked 6th 
of 9, with a GDP higher only than Bulgaria, Romania, and Serbia (World Bank, 2017). 
Croatia was in an interesting situation during the flood as they were about to officially 
join the EU as of July 1, 2013, just after the flood. From this, they did not have any of 
the policy frameworks from the EU in place, but were eligible to ask for EU aid after 
the flood. Most of the population of Croatia lives in the northern half of the country 
with a quarter in Zagreb and the surrounding areas (CIA, 2017). The Danube river 
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makes up the far eastern most boundary between Croatia and Serbia as it flows 
southward from Hungary. The Danube basin covers 63% of Croatia, most of the 
northern and central portion, and 69% of the population (Gascoigne, 2009). The Danube 
is a major transportation route for international trade in Croatia and provides most of the 
drinking water for the country. Croatia does have generally wider preserved floodplains 
than most of their neighbors, but 15% of the mainland is still at regular risk for flooding 
(ICPDR, 2010). Croatia’s political structure is a parliamentary republic with a civil law 
system. The executive branch has a President, directly elected by a simple majority of 
the popular vote, and Prime Minister, appointed by the President. The legislative branch 
has a unicameral Hrvatski Sabor with a variety of voting techniques, depending on the 




 The Czech Republic, or Czechia, joined the EU in 2004 and has been a 
democratic nation since 1989 (CIA, 2017). The Elbe River Basin covers most of the 
country and the Elbe itself goes through the capital city of Prague. Most of the previous 
flood policy has been centered on the Morava River after severe flood events in 1997 
and 2002 (ICPDR, 2007a). The Czech Republic’s political structure is a parliamentary 
republic with a new civil law system that was enacted in 2014 (CIA, 2017). Czechia’s 
federal government consists of a President, elected by absolute majority in a popular 
vote, and a Prime Minister, appointed by the President. The legislative branch has a 
bicameral Parliament with a Senate and Chamber of Deputies, or Poslanecka 
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Snemovna, both directly elected for 6- and 4-year terms, respectively (CIA, 2017). The 
new government that came into place in 2014 has been working on basic reforms to 
reduce corruption and maintain the economic strength of the country but because of this 
turnover in the middle of the policy analysis time frame there was a lack of data for any 
policy changes regarding disasters. It is unknown whether this is because of an actual 
lack of change or because action from the previous government was truncated. 
 
Germany 
 Germany is one of the most influential countries in all of Europe with the largest 
economy and largest population, except Russia (CIA, 2017). Germany was one of the 
six original members of the EU and the Eurozone. The southern German border is made 
by the Rhine River and the southern portion of the country, including Bavaria, has the 
Danube running through it (ICPDR, 2007b). The Danube River Basin only covers 17% 
of Germany, but Germany has the third largest population residing in the Danube River 
Basin at 9.4 million people, behind only Romania and Hungary (Gascoigne, 2009). 
Flooding is the most common natural hazard for which Germany has to plan. With this 
large flood risk, Germany has taken many steps to develop flood prediction 
technologies and flood control measures (ICPDR, 2007b; CIA, 2017). Germany’s 
political structure is a federal parliamentary republic with a civil law system. The 
executive branch has a President, indirectly elected by the Federal Parliament, and 
Chancellor, elected by the party in the Federal Parliament with the most representatives. 
Germany’s current Chancellor, Angela Merkel, has been serving in that capacity since 
2005. The legislative branch is a bicameral Parliament consisting of the Federal Council 
57 
or Bundesrat, appointed by state governments, and Bundestag, half elected by 
proportional representation and half elected by simple majority (CIA, 2017). 
 
Hungary 
 Hungary’s entire population, 10.1 million people, lives in the Danube River 
Basin and the capital city of Budapest is directly on the Danube itself (ICPDR, 2006b) 
.The Danube River Basin covers the entire country and Hungary contains the second 
highest percentage of total area of the basin for a single country at 11.6% (Gascoigne, 
2009). A quarter of Hungary’s population lives in a floodplain, along with a third of the 
rail system. Floods in Hungary have been known to last anywhere from hours to 
months. Because of this threat, they have developed flood protection systems consisting 
of emergency lowland flood reservoirs (ICPDR, 2006b). Hungary’s political structure is 
that of a parliamentary republic with a civil legal system directly inspired by the 
German government. The executive branch has a President, indirectly elected by the 
National Assembly by 2/3 majority, and a Prime Minister, elected by the National 
Assembly from recommendations via the President. The legislative branch is a 
unicameral National Assembly, about half directly elected by simple majority and the 
other half elected by proportional representation along party lines (CIA, 2017). 
 
Romania 
 Romania was a communist nation until 1996.  After the change Romania joined 
the EU, in 2007 (CIA, 2017). The Danube River forms the southern boundary with 
Serbia and Bulgaria and the river basin covers 97% of Romania, with 21.7 million 
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Romanians reside within the basin (Gascoigne, 2009). Romania’s water resources are 
generally limited so they have taken great care to prepare for flood events both 
structurally and non-structurally with reservoir systems and reforestation programs as 
well as flood zone maps, education, and warning systems and public encouragement for 
flood insurance programs (ICPDR, 2006c). Romania’s government is a semi-
presidential republic with a civil law system.  The executive branch consists of a 
President, directly elected by absolute majority, and a Prime Minister, appointed by the 
President with the consent of the Parliament. The legislative branch is a bicameral 
Parliament with a Senat and Chamber of Deputies, both of which are elected by 
proportional representation via a party list (CIA, 2017). 
 
Serbia 
Serbia is the only country included in this case study that is not a current 
member of the EU. With its turbulent past and ongoing negotiations about the 
independence of Kosovo there is a goal for entry into the EU by 2020 but not much 
progress has been made since accession talks began in 2014 (CIA, 2017). The Danube 
River makes up the northern-most boundary between Serbia and Romania. Ten percent 
of the Danube River Basin is in Serbia and covers 92% of the country (Gascoigne, 
2009). Serbia should have a lot of incentive to develop extensive water and flood 
policies as 90% of their available water comes from outside the country (ICPDR, 
2006d). In northern Serbia there are many levees and in central Serbia every major city 
lies in a flood plain. Serbia is prone to flash floods on smaller rivers and floods on 
major rivers are common; yet, their flood protection policy is almost non-existent 
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(ICPDR, 2006d). Serbia’s government structure is a parliamentary republic with a civil 
law system. The executive branch is made up of the President, directly elected by 
absolute majority popular vote, and Prime Minister, elected by the National Assembly. 
The legislative branch is a unicameral National Assembly with members serving in a 
single nationwide constituency and is elected by proportional representation by party 
affiliation (CIA, 2017). 
 
Slovakia 
Slovakia and the Czech Republic peacefully separated in 1993 and they both 
joined the EU at the same time in 2004 (CIA, 2017). Slovakia sits on the watershed 
divide between the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea and hosts parts of five different sub-
basins of the Danube River (ICPDR, 2007c). Only 6% of the Danube River Basin is in 
Slovakia but it covers 96% of the country and 5.2 million residents (Gascoigne, 2009). 
Slovakia experiences flooding often but it is usually a result of snowmelt and 
occasionally from summer precipitation. The cities are mostly already outfitted for 
flood protection along the major rivers (ICPDR, 2007c). Slovakia’s government 
structure is that of a parliamentary republic with a civil law system that was based off 
the Austro-Hungarian civil codes. The executive branch consists of a President, directly 
elected by absolute majority, and a Prime Minister, appointed by the President who is 
usually formerly the leader of the majority party. The legislative branch is a unicameral 
National Council or Narodna Rada, elected for a nation-wide constituency by 






Evaluations of the 2013 flood came from several sources, each having varying 
numbers and no consensus on the actual results. Some sources even claimed different 
countries were impacted or not. Data from multiple reports and databases were 
combined to get the most thorough picture of the flood impact. Switzerland, for 
example, was included in one flood report as being affected by the flood but because 
there were no reports of damage or any details at all from that source or any other, 
Switzerland was not included in the analysis. 
Noy’s Lifeyears measurement requires data for deaths, injuries, those made 
homeless, those affected, economic damage, recovery time, and per capita GDP (Noy, 
2015; EM-DAT, 2017; Liska, 2014; ZIC, 2014; Monguzzi and Norgaard, 2013; World 
Bank, 2017; UN, 2015; UN, 2017; BLS, 2017; EUROPA, 2017; Pa, 2013). In the 
original model, very specific data about each death and injury was available to be able 
to determine exactly how many potential years were lost for each person killed (Noy, 
2015). In this case, that level of specificity in data was not available, an average age per 
country, based on the closest demographic information, was used instead (World Bank, 
2017). 
Policies were obtained from each individual country’s government websites, 
records, and various reports on the subject. Because of limitations in English content, 
only policies on the national level are included on a more comprehensive scale and local 
flood policies are mentioned anecdotally. Information about government structure and 
transparency came from country profile reports and public international databases (CIA, 
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2017; CPI, 2017). Most of the policy information was derived from public records from 
the civil law systems, from UN reports of disaster risk program progress, or requests for 
aid, where the countries themselves are self-reporting their policies and policy goals as 
well as the circumstances around them. While these reports could be considered biased 
because they are self-reported, for our purposes they were deemed reliable. It is in each 
country’s best interest to be the most thorough as far as current policy but to also not 




To determine Lifeyears, a modified version of Noy’s model was used to 
incorporate the function of a non-monetary measurement of disaster impact with only 
estimated and debated data available. The Lifeyears formula is shown as Equations 2 
through 7, incorporating the World Health Organization’s disability-adjusted life year 
(DALY) and quality-adjusted life year (QALY) as well as Noy’s own formulas. Noy’s 
formula uses metrics for casualties, injured, affected, homelessness, and economic 
damage but the equation was made for the most detailed of disaster damage reports to 
which we did not have access in this case. An example of the calculations performed to 
obtain Lifeyears is shown in Equation 8, for the case of Austria. A compilation of the 
data used in this formula for each country is included in Table 2. 
Disaster policy changes were difficult to identify in some cases and therefore 
were only compared for countries with policy information available to the public. Each 
country’s policy changes were considered in context with previous policies that were 
already in place as well as their government structure and general relationships with 
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their citizens, i.e. are they known to be more representative of public concerns or more 
separated by corruption or dictatorship.  
Equation 2. Lifeyears 
𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 = 𝐿 𝑀, 𝐴89:;<, 𝐴9=> + 𝐼 𝑁 + 𝐹 𝑁 + 𝐻 𝑁 + 	𝐷𝐴𝑀 𝑌, 𝐼𝑁𝐶  
 
Equation 3. Mortality (L) 




M = number of deaths recorded 
Aexp= 92, WHO measure of uniform life expectancy 
Adeath= age of death in each case, without that degree of detail we use average 
age of citizens at the time of disaster 
 
Equation 4. Injured (I) 
𝑊ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒	𝐼 𝑁 = 𝛼𝑇𝑁 
a= for injured and affected, 0.054, welfare reduction weight WHO DALY for 
“generic uncomplicated disease; anxiety of diagnosis” 
T= time to return to normality 
for injured it is the length of injury which can be estimated by severity  
 N= number of injured persons recorded 
 
Equation 5. Affected (F) 
𝑊ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒	𝐹 𝑁 = 𝑇𝑁 
T= time to return to normality 
for affected it is the length of time it took the country to recover (usually  
in years) 
 N= number of affected persons recorded  
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Equation 6. Homelessness (H) 
𝑊ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒	𝐻 𝑁 = b𝑁 
b= for homeless, 0.117, WHO QALY 
 N= number of homeless persons recorded 
 
Equation 7. Economic Damages (DAM) 
𝑊ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒	𝐷𝐴𝑀(𝑌, 𝐼𝑁𝐶) =
1 − 𝑐 𝑌
𝐼𝑁𝐶  
c= 0.75, acknowledging that we spend most of our time on non-work activities 
 Y= damage estimates 
 INC=per capita income at time of disaster 
 
Equation 8. Example Lifeyears Calculation of 2013 Flood in Austria 
𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 = (92 − 41.42)
U.VW
O()
+ 0.054 ∗ 0 + 0.5 ∗ 200 + (0.117 ∗ 500)
+
1 − 0.75 616298774.33
53965.43  
 
Table 3. Flood Impact Data Averaged Across Sources 
Each source for damage and persons affected in the 2013 flood were slightly different 
depending on their measurement methods. Here is an averaged number for each country 
across sources (BLS, 2017; EM-DAT, 2017; EUROPA, 2017; Fewtrell et al., 2013; 
Liska, 2014; Monguzzi and Norgaard, 2013; Pa, 2013; UN, 2015; UN, 2017; World 




Country Death Injury Homeless Affected Damage Recovery Time Average Age Per Capita GDP Lifeyears
USD (2018) Fraction of a Year USD (2018)
Austria 4.75    -    500.00       200.00       616,298,774.33     0.50                   41.42            53,965.43            3,253.81     
Bulgaria -     -    -            248.40       1,839,661.58        0.33                   41.87            8,166.05              139.12       
Croatia -     -    -            -            141,512.43           0.33                   41.66            14,443.52            2.45           
Czech Republic 11.00  -    12,666.67   882,266.67 566,644,314.46     0.50                   42.17            21,190.64            449,848.54 
Germany 4.00    -    7,350.00    29,425.00   5,401,713,901.63  2.00                   47.46            49,508.89            87,164.59   
Hungary -     -    -            48,565.00   82,077,209.01      0.25                   42.02            14,542.44            13,552.24   
Romania 4.00    -    -            1,468.80     65,237,229.92      0.42                   42.16            10,198.72            2,410.51     
Serbia -     -    -            -            396,234.80           0.08                   36.82            6,760.47              14.65         




Table 4. Lifeyears Results with Brief Country Profile 
 
 
Figure 29. Total Lifeyears Lost 
Graphical representation of Table 3 on a logarithmic scale. 
 
 
Country Lifeyears Income Level EU Member
Austria 3,253.81     High Yes
Bulgaria 139.12        Upper Middle Yes
Croatia 2.45           Upper Middle Yes
Czech Republic 449,848.54  High Yes
Germany 87,164.59   High Yes
Hungary 13,552.24   Upper Middle Yes
Romania 2,410.51     Upper Middle Yes
Serbia 14.65         Upper Middle No
Slovak Republic 575.18        High Yes
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Lifeyears measurements, shown in Table 3 and graphically in Figure 29, 
indicate the most affected country was Czech Republic by a large margin. Next was 
Germany, followed by Hungary, Austria, Romania, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Serbia, and last 
Croatia.  
 For each country, there is a very different background of policy pre-2013, many 
have been influenced by previous floods, but not always in the same ways or to the 
same degree. There was a major flood of the Elbe River in 2002 and another flood of 
Danube in 2005. Climatologically, floods have been increasing over time with new 
records set three times since 2002 (Gascoigne, 2009).  
In terms of reliability of representation, each country involved in the study ranks 
between 41-57 on the Corruption Perception Index, on a scale from 0-100 with 0 being 
highly corrupt. Germany and Austria are the only countries outside that range at 81 and 
75 respectively (CPI, 2017). From this we can gather that there is almost an equal 
comparison value between all the subjects, excluding Germany and Austria which were 
already exceptional in their post-flood policy actions. 
The Czech Republic, which was the most impacted, did not have much 
information available regarding any disaster policy, so no conclusions were able to be 
made about an evaluation of policy changes. A few actions were mentioned in press 
conferences from the new Czechia government, but none of the statements related to 
these policies (that were not available publically) mentioned the 2013 floods 
specifically. The Czechia government did mention the 2002 flood in one instance 
(Brabec, 2015; Sequensová, 2014). 
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Germany experienced the major flood of the Elbe River in 2002 and made 
changes that were adopted in 2005 to improve flood control and define 100-year flood 
plains (Mrzyglocki, 2015). The full implementations of 100-year flood plain maps were 
to be done by 2012 and have flood risk management plans done by 2015. The policy 
also established legal responsibilities for each level of government in flood prevention, 
warning, and recovery, and funding for research was planned to establish a common 
strategy for adaptation to climate change. Even with the previous policy changes from 
floods in the past, Germany did have an acknowledgement of lessons learned from the 
2013 flood in their national plan in 2015 when they observed that social media played a 
role in informing those affected and allowing more efficient distribution of volunteers 
and first responders (Mrzyglocki, 2015). The goal of the plan was to use this 
observation to ensure the communication is accurate and efficiently managed.  
Hungary was faced with immense damages across the country from the flood. 
They publically acknowledge that despite high economic damage and many people 
affected, there were no casualties in Hungary. They attributed this to their “prevention 
and resilience measures” (Bakondi, 2015). To deal with the high number of people 
affected with damages, the government instituted a new way to compensate for disaster 
damages following the flood (Bakondi, 2015). Slovakia already had some flood 
protection policies in place before the flood, namely a partnership with Ukraine for an 
early warning system across both of their at risk populations (Burian, 2015). Post-flood 
Slovakia has moved to create more mitigation and protection plans instead of just 
warning (Burian, 2015).  
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Austria’s reaction post-flood in terms of disaster policy was to alter their budget 
to speed previously docketed flood protection plans. While this is a type of reaction it is 
policy change, it is not a change to include new content (Pichler, 2016). Bulgaria had 
virtually no policy change shown. Even in public statements on risk reduction, they 
made no mention of past disasters or any reason to make disaster policy changes in the 
future. Romania was lacking in public information at all and no conclusion was made as 
to their policy response post-flood.  
In Croatia, they had a devastating flood in 2014 that is mentioned in subsequent 
policy numerous times while the 2013 flood was not mentioned. Even in the 2014 flood, 
the statements made in government reports offer only vague objectives, for example, 
“Recent events in Croatia (2014 floods in Slavonia) will result in many lessons 
learnt that should be supplemented by lessons learned from future cooperation 
and exercises and implemented into legislation and practice in order to 
economize resources and avoid duplications and lack of coordination of 
activities in all phases of disaster management.” (Holcinger, 2015:44) 
The Croatian flood of 2014 in Slavonia, based on a non-exhaustive search for damage 
statistics, would be estimated at 151,906.02 Lifeyears lost, which would put that flood 
at about the same level as the magnitude Hungary experienced in the 2013 flood (EM-
DAT, 2017). It makes more sense in that context why the government would be much 
more inclined to make policy changes as a result of that flood rather than the one in this 
case study. Serbia was much the same case; they were severely affected by the same 
May 2014 flood that Croatia experienced and they made substantial changes to flood 
policy following that flood rather than the locally less intense flood of 2013. Following 
the 2014 flood, Serbia requested aid from the European Union, World Bank, and United 
Nations to establish flood protection, a disaster risk reduction program, a post-disaster 
reconstruction law, and, after recovering, even became a donor to the Global Facility for 
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Disaster Reduction and Recovery to help pay it forward for the aid they received 
(Blagojevic, 2017). 
 Observations of regional and international cooperation were also found 
following the floods. In 2014, the state of Bavaria in Germany and state of Upper 
Austria in Austria signed agreements on joint flood research and cross-border flood 
protection measures. They stated the motivation being the effects from the floods of the 




The results show that the hypothesis was correct, as far as the data that were 
available, in that the countries with the most progress in policy following the 2013 
floods were Germany and Hungary. Also, supporting the hypothesis, Austria and 
Slovakia lost more Lifeyears in relation to some of their flood-affected neighbors, and 
in turn, had changes to their disaster policy following the flood.  
The least impacted countries, Bulgaria, Croatia, and Serbia, had virtually no 
policy change in response to the flood. In the case of Serbia and Croatia, especially, this 
was not just a function of an unconnected government because both had a legitimate 
response to a larger flood the year after (EM-DAT, 2017; Holcinger, 2015; Blagojevic, 
2017). No conclusions were made about Romania or the Czech Republic because of a 
lack of information. While the Czech Republic did not seem to have any policy changes 
in relation to the flood, it is still unknown if this is because there really was no reaction 
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or if it was a function of their government structure change in 2014 and lack of public 
record.  
A specific threshold for policy change could not be distinguished without more 
comprehensive data. This analysis opens many new avenues into efficiency evaluations 
of post-flood policies and the evolution of national disaster risk reduction plans. Toward 
this goal though, the Croatian and Serbian response to this flood in comparison to their 
more intense flood the next year shows the relationship between disaster magnitude and 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
Disasters, as a whole, do a lot of damage around the world. Climate change is 
affecting the disasters and the more we are aware of the changes the more we can do to 
be prepared. At COP 23 in Bonn, Germany, in November 2017, the President of Chad 
stood up, referencing disasters that he and his neighbors had experienced, “These are 
not natural disasters. These are the result of short sighted policy decisions.” This is 
exactly why it is important to make smart policy changes and create solutions out of bad 
situations, like disasters. 
From the results of these studies there is a lot of significance to be drawn. From 
Chapter 2, looking at how individual countries react to multiple disasters, we found that 
there are hot spots or time periods in which there are more disasters, and this alone 
could give rise to countless other research questions surrounding the geographic and 
temporal distribution of disasters. Second, while the general pattern of disaster hot spot 
and subsequent policy implementation was found to be statistically insignificant, 
correlations still exist. Future studies can look at other factors in policy change and 
other relationships between disasters and climate policy to find means to take advantage 
of policy windows that disasters create. 
From Chapter 3, looking at how multiple countries react to a single disaster, we 
found that there are differing reactions between countries and some of these difference 
cannot be explained simply by type of government. There was also a clear example of 
international cooperation attributed to the disaster. Even though that was not the goal of 
the study, future studies could look exclusively at international or regional policy 
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change in response to a collective disaster. Examples from multiple countries showed 
that the disaster did, in fact, act as an individual actor in the policy scenario, even in 
cases where there were not as many actual policy changes. In most cases with a lack of 
policy change, there were references to other floods in which there were more extensive 
revisions to policy.  
While these studies were originally based off Thomas Birkland’s work using the 
Multiple Streams framework, it was obvious with the difference in data available that 
other frameworks may be more suited to the analysis. Using the framework options 
outlined in Chapter 2 to interpret the results we come to some conclusions beyond what 
the Multiple Streams framework can explain. The original studies had access to much 
more detailed policy data and motivations and political attitude shifts at the same time. 
With the data publicly available of disasters, only the problem stream encompasses the 
given variable, which is not useful for making conclusions in this study.  
The Policy Diffusion Model seems to match the ideas of the studies very 
closely. The only missing data is the history of each policy and its process through 
adoption and implementation. As far as applications of the model, both studies here 
would fit the variable requirements looking at the temporal nature of policy diffusion, 
but because the actual policies and their main ideas and goals are not included, it does 
not fit the requirement to look at horizontal diffusion (Shipan and Volden, 2013). For 
this aspect, we would need to know content and consequences of policies to 
differentiate between imitation and learning or to attribute the change to competition or 
coercion. 
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The Punctuated Equilibrium Model looks primarily at outcomes by their policy 
context. Conceptually, it may seem like the first study would not match this outlook at 
all because there was no depth in policy content, as any implementation was considered 
to be a singular version of change without designating degree. On the other hand, one of 
the only statistically significant indicators was that of framework policies, which by 
definition, would be considered to be major change. This would give the clear 
indication that it was a case of policy questioned and therefore changed at a 
fundamental level. For the case study, there were some incremental changes and some 
major changes but that does not change the idea behind the results. The fact that 
disasters were attributed to be the cause of policy change by the policy makers 
themselves indicates that whether the change is incremental or not does not matter, it 
still shows disasters as a policy change driver. The main limitation in this case is that 
not every nation included in the studies are democracies and thus it cannot be 
conclusively determined if they would be motivated by the rationality that backs 
Punctuated Equilibrium Theory. For the worldwide analysis, the countries with 
correlations in policy to disasters are almost all democracies (the lack of non-
democratic states could be explained by this criteria). For the flood case study, every 
country included is considered democratic in some sense of the word and can therefore 
use this model effectively. 
While the Advocacy Coalition Theory is extensive and includes innovations in 
disasters as focusing events, it still, like the Multiple Streams Model, focuses on actions 
of those policy actors more than the events or policy outputs. While this would be the 
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most useful in future studies, especially those on truly international climate policies, this 
does not match the data available for this analysis.  
The overall conclusion in regard to a theoretical framework that matches a 
macro approach to policy change studies is that there isn’t one. Each of the frameworks 
evaluated and generally applied in similar cases were developed and have been applied 
to work on micro scales with much more detailed data than would be available without 
large amounts of funding and labor. The framework that best matches the public data 
available for studies such as this in discussing how disasters may or may not be a driver 
for international climate policy change is the Punctuated Equilibrium Model. This 
model is not a perfect match but fits the data better than the others as far as the focus on 
policy and events rather than policy entrepreneurs and decision makers when that data 
is not readily available at the scales of analysis. 
Lastly, in the concept of nature, we learn from the countless examples of policy 
change between both studies but especially for specific disaster policy that we can 
change ‘nature’ in the way that we react to it. No part of the world is untouched by 
humans, but we can be responsible in how we deal with the effect of nature by using 
concepts of flood plain protections instead of levees or education instead of civil 
engineering to help to handle ‘natural’ disasters as they come. 
As an added observation, the original motivation of this research was climate-
related disasters and policy change. As a requirement for definitive conclusions, the 
disaster would have to be attributed to climate change specifically. While attribution 
studies are growing in extent, there has not been a study done on every relevant disaster. 
Perception of the disaster can attribute it to climate change without any scientific 
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reasoning to back that. In the studies of German disaster policy changes post-2013 
floods they specifically state, in a passing section about media involvement, a 
relationship to climate change for recent natural disasters.  
“The German press landscape (even the mass media) has had a larger focus on 
natural disasters and the impacts of climate change, at the latest since the Elbe 
Flood in 2002, 2013 and the Tsunami in 2004.” (Mrzyglocki, 2015:59) 
While this statement is not necessarily founded in scientific research, (tsunamis are very 
obviously not climate-related because they are caused by earthquakes, which are 
geological instead of meteorological) the fact that the media or the government thinks 
there is a relationship to climate change at all will make them relate the solutions to the 
wider issue of climate change rather than just disaster planning. That alone, can give us 
hope.  
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